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Executive Summary  
This thesis investigates the bivariate long term stochastic relationship between the 
import Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) prices in Japan, USA and EU. The bivariate 
testing of these prices series reveals that the regional prices are cointegrated.  
The test concludes these results based on Engle and Granger’s two step cointegration 
approach with and without the homogeneity restriction imposed. The results are 
concluded at a ten percent significance level, and suggest that the imported LNG 
prices has not diverted too far from each other between January 1997 and July 2008.   
The test concludes with cointegration, despite the different competitive environments 
of imported LNG in the three markets: Japan, EU and USA. The Error Correction 
Model (ECM), illustrating the cointegration mechanisms in place between the 
markets, reveals differences in how the markets are cointegrated. Deviations from the 
long term equilibrium explain price changes in all three markets, thus the relative law 
of one price holds.  
The relative LNG import price increases in Japan seem to explain relative LNG 
import price increases in the EU and the United States. However, price signal 
transfers from Japan seem to be faster in the case of EU than in terms of the United 
States. This may imply that the import LNG market of EU and Japan are more closely 
integrated. In the case of EU and United States, the imported LNG price signals also 
seem to be transferred immediately between the two markets.            
The test also reveals that an increase in import LNG prices in Japan results in an 
increase in import LNG prices in the United States and the EU. The test shows the 
same, in the case for the EU and United States, with import LNG price increases in 
the EU leading to a import LNG price increase in the United States.    
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1. Introduction  
The current development of the Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) industry and its role in 
bridging the price gap across regions has recently become an interesting arena of 
discourse following higher prices in gas consuming markets (prior to the 2008 
financial crisis). Numerous articles have been authored over the last few years 
exploring the premise that the process of globalization has made commodity markets 
become more integrated than before. This has also greatly affected energy markets 
and, specifically, the existence of a global gas price has become an issue. With the oil 
price dancing to the tune of global markets forces – or the other way around – why 
should the price of gas be any different? 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) has shown an interest in the rapid growth of 
LNG. The IEA devotes much of its 2008 natural gas market review to the topic of 
LNG, scrutinizing LNG’s potential to bridge the price gap between regional markets 
(IEA, 2008). It is evident that due to local factors of demand, there are incentives for 
taking advantage of the price differences between markets. However, evidence from 
L'Hegaret et.al (2004) suggests that many have refrained from taking advantage of 
these opportunities. Many of these opportunities, it is argued, may have been 
attributed to the limited flexibility of LNG contracts and the rigid regional market 
structures.  
The advancement of technology in the areas of gas liquefaction, re-gasification and 
transportation, coupled with an increasing concern for the environment, has increased 
the interest for LNG as an important energy alternative relative to other fossil fuels 
such as crude oil, coal and nuclear energy. Despite the economic viability of LNG 
however, the current literature available tends to be conclusive and eyes little hope 
for a global gas price between the four regional gas trading hubs. Nevertheless, the 
literature suggests degrees of integration and, between some of the regional markets, 
the law of one price holds. Neumann et al. (2006) for example analyses the potential 
for transatlantic convergence of natural gas prices. The article seems to show some 
evidence of seasonal price convergence across the Atlantic.  
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The framework provided by Engle and Granger is a simple method to test the notion 
of integration of markets. Should such integration be proven, it would have important 
effects in an industry where the market potential and reach of a commodity are such 
important factors for investments. A global gas market would attract more 
investments and invite more players to introduce greater competition on both the 
supply and demand side. This would in turn further eliminate the market 
inefficiencies, and the law of one price would hold. 
The thesis finds evidence to suggest that long term integration between regional 
imported Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is present. This may be motivated by both 
regional arbitrage opportunities (taking advantage of price differences between 
markets) and regional links to the global oil market.     
This thesis is divided into four sections. In the first section, natural gas and the 
concept of LNG are introduced. The second section discusses the theoretical 
framework of the cointegration test, while the third section reports the results of the 
cointegration test between the regional prices. The results from the cointegration test 
are discussed in the final section. 
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2. Introduction to natural gas and LNG 
Natural gas is a non-renewable energy source predominantly used by residential, 
commercial and heavy industries, as well as electricity generators. In the residential 
and commercial sectors, natural gas is used primarily for indoor heating purposes 
(EIA, 2008a).  Heavy industries also make use of natural gas as a source of heating in 
the manufacturing of goods. Besides other energy uses, and especially electricity 
generation, many industries also use natural gas an ingredient in fertilizers, 
photographic ink and laundry detergents, to name but a few (EIA, 2008a).  
Natural gas contains on average 90% methane and some other gases such as propane 
and butane (EIA, 2008a). This non-renewable resource can also be found on land, 
however the majority of natural gas is found offshore (EIA, 2008a). Here, natural gas 
can be found in pockets together with oil, referred to as “associated natural gas”, or 
separately, referred to as “non-associated gas”. 
 There are currently 177.36 trillion cubic meters of proven natural gas reserves (BP, 
2008). At the current annual global rate of consumption, this is sufficient to last for 
another 60 years. However, the rate of consumption has historically increased at a 
faster pace than the increase in proven natural gas reserves (BP, 2008). Thus the 
number of years with natural gas is likely to be less. 
Natural gas is very difficult to transport in its gaseous form but can be cooled down to 
a liquid form called liquefied natural gas or LNG for short (EIA, 2003). LNG is thus 
natural gas that is stored and transported in liquid form at atmospheric pressure and a 
temperature of -162  (EIA, 2003). At this temperature, the natural gas reduces its 
volume by a factor of 610 (EIA, 2003). Therefore liquefying natural gas provides the 
means to transport large quantities of gas over long distances, when pipeline transport 
is not feasible (EIA, 2003). 
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2.1 LNG Overview 
In 1997, 116 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas were traded as LNG (EIA, 
2003). This increased to 226 bcm in 2007 (BP, 2007), which is approximately 29% of 
the overall global gas trade. In other words, LNG has emerged as a growing global 
industry. In 2008, there were 16 countries exporting LNG (Morikawa, 2008), which 
is an increase from 9 LNG exporting countries in 1997 (EIA, 2003). In 2002 there 
were 12 LNG importing countries, and in 2009 the number of countries with installed 
LNG importing facilities rose to 16 (Morikawa, 2008).  
LNG has become the fossil fuel of choice for many countries for several reasons. 
Firstly, it is considered to be an effective means of diversifying a country’s 
geopolitical dependence on other fossil fuels (Reymond, 2007). Secondly, along with 
natural gas, LNG is an environmentally friendly fossil fuel due to its relatively lower 
greenhouse gas emissions. Thus it has replaced coal and oil in electricity generation 
and heating in many heavy industries (EIA, 2008a). Thirdly, the IEA (2008b) 
explains the surge in LNG by referring to the difficulties associated with placing 
international pipelines. Besides its lower costs (1000 km of pipeline estimated to cost 
USD 1-2 billion depending on terrain and conditions) (IEA, 2008), LNG has greater 
flexibility and only requires a regasification terminal and domestic pipeline 
infrastructure for reception. Major international pipeline projects, on the other hand, 
must face multiple frontiers both on economic and geopolitical terms, including 
transit issues, legal and regulatory matters (IEA, 2008). Moreover their market is 
limited to one geographical area, which must be both large and financially liquid to 
ensure a high long term price and return of their investments (IEA, 2008). 
Nevertheless, LNG requires relatively more investments in its value chain 
(exploration, liquefaction, shipping, and regasification) than does pipeline natural 
gas. Despite the difficulties associated with estimating the investment cost of LNG, 
the IEA provides an estimate of how much a company would need to invest to 
develop a new natural gas field for LNG purposes. They believe that it will cost USD 
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3-5 billion for liquefaction, USD 2 billion for shipping and a further USD 0,8-1 
billion per terminal for regasification (IEA, 2008).  
Due to these relatively large investment requirements, the LNG industry originally 
developed a business model based on long-term contracts (Mazighi, 2006). These 
LNG contracts typically spanned over 20 years and have traditionally been rigid 
(IEA, 2007). The contracts are generally formed with “take-or-pay” clauses (Mazighi, 
2006), meaning that the buyer is required to pay for the gas, irrespective of whether 
the gas is taken or not (Tusiani and Shearer, 2007). Many contracts also have a 
destination clauses attached to them, implying that the LNG cannot be sold on to 
others after purchase (Tusiani and Shearer, 2007). These contracts are normally 
signed 5 years prior to liquefaction plant construction, securing producers a demand 
for the natural gas (IEA, 2008) and also ensuring buyers the access to natural gas. 
However, the traditional model of doing LNG business is currently being challenged 
by a relatively new business model that has recently emerged along with the 
liberalization of natural gas markets around the world. The new LNG business model 
includes more short-term gas market sales, and greater destination-flexibility in 
contracts. Two players which have embraced this new form of business model are BG 
and GDF Suez (BG Group, 2009) (Suez, 2007).  
To explore the new business model further, Mazighi (2006) provides an analytical 
overview of the types of players who could benefit from its use. They include two 
types of players, namely existing producers of LNG and large oil companies. First, 
existing LNG producers who have covered a large part of their initial business 
investment costs should be able to carry the risk associated with shorter term 
contracts or even marketing uncontracted LNG quantities (Mazighi, 2006). This is 
because the initial costs associated with LNG exploration and liquefaction, are much 
greater than maintaining or enhancing existing production fields (Mazighi, 2006). 
Second, Mazighi (2006) identifies large oil companies as a potential player to 
embrace the new business model. Their large oil revenues provide the necessary 
backbone to carry the price risks associated with greater LNG flexibility (Mazighi, 
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2006). In other words, they have the financial stability to withstand volatility in LNG 
prices over time.  
2.2 LNG - linking regional markets 
The market for natural gas is currently undergoing change, as regionally isolated 
markets are becoming more integrated (Neuman, et. al, 2006). Economic theory 
predicts that prices in different regions will converge towards the law of one price 
until the difference in price only represents transportation or transaction costs 
(Neuman, et. al, 2006). In other words, the law of one price (LOOP) describes a 
situation where a homogeneous good is always sold at the same price irrespective of 
the market..  
Natural gas has undergone a large transformation over the past decade, including its 
liberalization in most of the world’s markets, a restructuring of former supply chains, 
and a fall in transportation costs, to name a few (Neuman, et. al, 2006). These factors 
along with similar developments for LNG have pushed for the emergence of a new 
“international market”, replacing the former regionally-separated markets of North 
America, Europe, and Asia (Neuman, et. al, 2006).   
The United States of America (USA), Japan and the European Union (EU) are the 
three largest consumer markets for LNG. They differ in their import structure of 
LNG, and thus LNG import prices have also been different. In the USA, LNG plays a 
minor role and constitutes a low share of the overall natural gas production and 
pipeline import (BP, 2008). In the EU, both pipeline and LNG imports coexist (BP, 
2008). The proportions of LNG in the different EU markets differ. Japan however, is 
fully dependent on LNG for its supply of natural gas (BP, 2008). Thus these markets 
differ, and in a well functioning LNG industry players may seek to explore the 
arbitrage opportunities that it provides. Consequently, through arbitrage LNG would 
then be able to transfer regional price signals to different markets. 
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2.2.1 The LNG market in the US 
The American LNG market was ranked as the fourth largest in the world in 2007 (BP, 
2008). Despite being a large global consumer of LNG, the share of LNG only makes 
up approximately 3.3% percent of a 653 billion cubic meter consumption market (BP, 
2008). Most of the natural gas consumed in USA is domestically produced. Another 
important source is imports from Mexico and Canada, constituting 15% of total 
natural gas use (BP, 2008). LNG is commonly used for “peak shaving” (Foss, 2007), 
a way for local electric power and natural gas companies to store gas during periods 
of peak demand that cannot be met by their traditional pipeline sources (Foss, 2007). 
Peak shaving occurs during the winter season for heating or during the summer, when 
LNG is commonly used for generating electricity for air-conditioning (Foss, 2007).  
A number of liberalizing initiatives have taken place since the 1978 Natural Gas 
Policy Act (naturgas.org, 2004). As a result of successive deregulation measures, the 
US natural gas market has become highly interconnected. The USA has emerged as 
the most financially liquid natural gas market in the world. The Henry Hub in 
Louisiana grew to become the largest trading hub for natural gas for both physical 
and virtual transactions. Physical trading hub refers to commercial trades with 
physical delivery of natural gas at a precise physical location, whereas virtual trading 
hub does not have a physical delivery point for natural gas. The hub is closely 
connected to 16 pipelines which stretch across the country’s LNG infrastructure and 
natural gas storage facilities (EnergyUSA, 2008). The hub is also a market centre for 
LNG, with most long-term LNG contracts being linked to the Henry Hub prices. 
Figure 1 illustrates the closeness between the latter and the price of LNG in the US. 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
Figure 1: Henry Hub Price and US LNG Price series 
   
Source: IEA 2009 and EIA, 2009 
 
The traditional link between LNG prices and the Henry Hub prices has been rooted in 
Ex-ship pricing of LNG, meaning that the seller is responsible for all costs associated 
with delivery to the agreed destination including the cost of shipping the LNG 
(Jensen, 2004). However, today more Free On Board (F.O.B.) contracted LNG is 
being sold, where the LNG cargo is delivered to the tanker at the liquefaction 
terminal (Zhu and Maxwell, 2008). Here, shipping and insurance-associated costs are 
the responsibility of the buyer (Maxwell and Zhu, 2008). These types of contracts 
provide buyers with greater flexibility regarding shipping costs and the ability to 
exploit profit opportunities through arbitrage. In the US, these short-term contracts 
represented 80% of American trade in LNG in 2003 and 70% in 2004 (Office of 
Fossil Energy, 2005 in Zhu and Maxwell, 2008). 
Zhu and Maxwell (2008) illustrate this point by referring to the link between the LNG 
price and the volume of imported LNG. They claim that a higher Henry Hub price 
results in more LNG being exported to the American market.   In other words, most 
of the cargoes arriving in the US are short term cargoes that are sensitive to prices in 
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the US market. Prices in EU and Japan have in recent years surpassed market prices 
in the United States, resulting in the occasional diversions of cargos from the United 
States to these countries (EIAb, 2008).  
LNG is not the marginal fuel of demand and thus international supplies of LNG do 
not set the price in the US market. In other words, local factors of supply and demand 
govern the price of LNG in the US market. Therefore it is not surprising that after a 
preliminary glance at the price development over the last 10 years in USA, traces of 
seasonality in the monthly prices can be observed. These have emerged due to 
relatively high prices during winter seasons and moderately high prices during three 
summer months (May to July) as indicated in Figure 2 below. The Figure shows the 
average monthly price development during the last 10 years, where the 100 percent 
level represents the average price except for the abnormal years of 2001-02 
(Californian Crisis) and 2005-06 (Hurricanes). These will be discussed further under 
the data section.  
Figure 2: Degree of Seasonality in Imported US LNG Prices 
 
Source: analysis is based on data from IEA 2009  
 
During the winter months, the Figure shows that prices are well above the 10 year 
average price while during the summer months the price is lower than the average. 
Nevertheless, one can see that the import LNG price increases slightly during the 
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months of May to July. In other words, the US shows traces of two seasons in their 
average import of LNG prices. 
2.2.2 The Japanese LNG market 
With little access to domestic production and pipeline natural gas from neighboring 
countries, Japan has become the largest consumer of LNG in the world (BP, 2008). In 
2007, Japan consumed more LNG than the aggregated consumption of the three next 
largest LNG consuming markets: South Korea, Spain and the USA (BP, 2008). In 
spite of this high LNG import dependence, LNG and natural gas represent only a 
fraction of the total energy market in Japan (EIA, 2008c). There are mainly two areas 
in where LNG plays a significant role, namely electricity generation and the heavy 
industry sector. 60 % of the imported LNG is used for electricity generation. This 
produces 24% of the overall generation of electricity in Japan (EIA, 2008c). In the 
industry sector, natural gas has increasingly been replacing oil as a source of fuel 
(EIA, 2008c). This is in line with Japans Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry’s 
(METI) New National Energy Strategy, which aims to reduce the country’s 
dependence on oil (EIA, 2008c).  
The majority of Japan’s LNG imports are in the form of long term contracts with 
prices linked to the Japanese Crude Cocktail (JCC) Price basket (a range of oil 
products) (Zhang, et al., 2007). These products are traded globally, introducing an 
element of competition into the Japanese LNG price.  It also provides the Japanese 
LNG price with limited flexibility to reflect demand conditions in the country. 
However, spot cargoes have been purchased to meet flexible demand (Zhang, et al., 
2007). Nevertheless, these transactions have been relatively small and insignificant 
(Zhang, et al., 2007).  
The JCC linked price is illustrated in the Figure 3, where shape of the curve 
resembles the letter s. It illustrates that when the JCC prices exceed price B, then the 
LNG price is traded below oil parity. However, below price A, it is traded above oil 
parity (Zhang, et al., 2007). The range between price A and price B represents oil 
parity (Zhang, et al., 2007).  
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Figure 3: Japanese S-curve with LNG Import Price Relationship to Crude 
Oil 
 
The LNG pricing mechanism in Japan is designed to ensure the interest of the seller if 
the oil price drops below a price, and protect the interest of the buyers if it rises above 
a given ceiling (Zhang, et al., 2007).  
The Figure below shows the link between WTI oil price and monthly imported LNG 
price, illustrating the link to oil prices. 
Figure 4: Japanese Imported LNG Price and Crude Oil Price (WTI) 
 
Source: IEA 2009 and EIA 2009 
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Many of these contracts are currently expiring however and are being replaced by 
shorter term contracts, lower volumes and possibly higher prices. These LNG 
contracts will most probably include greater destination flexibility. An example of 
this flexibility are LNG cargoes from Sakhalin (Jensen, 2008), which the LNG buyer 
can resell to other markets if the gas is not needed in the intended market or if price is 
higher elsewhere.     
Lastly, there is also some evidence to suggest that the prices may show seasonal 
fluctuations in Japan, as illustrated in Figure 5, with August to December prices being 
higher than the 10 year average. However, the price does not increase at the same 
level as LNG import prices in the USA. 
Figure 5: Price Seasonality in Japanese LNG Import Prices 
 
Source: analysis is based on data from IEA 2009 
2.2.3 The European LNG market 
52 billion cubic meters of LNG were imported to Europe in 2007, constituting 13% 
of total natural gas consumption in continental Europe (BP, 2008).  Most of the 
natural gas supply is delivered through pipeline from Norway, Russia and North 
Africa or produced within continental Europe (BP, 2008). While demand for natural 
gas grows and European domestic supplies are stagnating, Europe is becoming more 
import dependent (IEA, 2008).  
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The EU is currently undergoing a process of liberalization to meet two goals, namely 
increasing competition and ensuring security of supply (Dorigoni and Portatadino, 
2008). Panagiotidis and Rutledge (2005) show that the relationship between the 
natural gas price and the price of oil has become more volatile over time. This may 
indicate that the natural gas price is to a lesser degree interwoven with the oil price. 
Neumann et al. (2006) showed that price convergence between different Continental 
European markets is still an issue and provides a hurdle for disseminating global 
price signals to the entire EU market. As noted by Neuman et.al. (2006), this can be 
attributed to the barriers to entry into the EU market. However, article 22 of the 
European Gas Directive 2003/55/EC has eased some of these barriers.  
The role of LNG in the EU is growing. There are currently 12 terminals in Europe, 
with Spain and France boasting the largest number of regasification terminals. 
Moreover, 12 terminals are under construction today, and another 39 are being 
planned to operate in predominantly Italy, the UK and Spain (Dorigoni and 
Portatadino, 2008). Despite the high number it is important to note that not all of 
them will be constructed. Nevertheless, this provides foundation for a greater role for 
LNG in Europe.       
Figure 6: EU Import Prices and Crude Oil Price (Brent) 
  
Source: IEA 2009 and EIA 2009 
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The import price of LNG in Europe has traditionally been linked to the Brent oil 
price, with a lag of 4 to 8 months (Zhang, et al., 2007). The link to oil was introduced 
to ensure competitiveness in LNG prices with historically weak downstream 
competition (IEA, 2008). It also meant that it could compete Brent Crude Oil.   
The European market also shows evidence of seasonality, with prices increasing from 
September to December. As can be seen in Figure 7 below, and similar to the 
seasonal trend experienced in Japan, there is only one season of high demand. 
Figure 7: EU Import LNG Price Seasonality 
   
Source: analysis is based on data from IEA 2009 
 
2.3 Data description 
The data used in this project to test the regional convergence of prices are the 
monthly import LNG prices in Japan, Europe and the USA as published in the IEA’s 
Energy Prices and Statistics. The prices are reported in US dollars per million British 
therms unit and currency conversions are based on IEAs own conversion rates.  The 
time period investigated ranges from January 1997 to July 2008. This is prior to the 
financial crisis, which has prompted a re-evaluation of the future projections for LNG 
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markets and trade, according to many of the speakers at the Doha Natural Gas 
Conference, held in March 2009 (Eisbrenner, 2009) (Small, 2009).  
In Table 1, the average monthly import price of Japan is higher than that of the other 
two markets. The reason why Japanese import prices are generally higher than the 
others is due to a number of factors including: the higher number of days of 
transportation; Japan’s high terminal charges; the lack of competition from pipeline 
gas; and the fact that the Japanese Crude Oil Cocktail is based on imported oil 
products which add to the price of LNG due to the shipping cost of oil (Davoust, 
2008). 
Table 1: Description LNG Import Data in Japan, EU and USA 
Descriptive Statistics         
 
EU Japan USA 
 Means ($/MMBtu) 4.11 5.26 4.87 
 Standard Deviation 
($/MMBtu) 1.79 1.93 2.38 
 Skewness 1.0314 1.3726 1.0123 
 Excess Kurtosis 0.19362 2.0843 0.59572 
 Minimum ($/MMBtu) 1.18 2.74 2.04 
 Maximum ($/MMBtu) 9.16 11.95 12.3 
 
     Correlation Matrix 
   
 
 
EU Japan USA 
 EU 1.00 0.97 0.88 
 Japan 0.97 1.00 0.85 
 USA 0.88 0.85 1.00 
  
Source: analysis is based on data from IEA 2009 
 
The Figures above indicate that the price variation in the Japanese price series ranges 
from $/MMBtu 2.74 and $/MMBtu 11.95. This may be attributed to the fact that 
LNG has been purchased on-spot due to technical problem associated with the 
Chūetsu offshore earthquake of July 2007, which forced the shutting down of the 
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant in June 2008. As of April 2009 the power 
plant, the largest in the world, remains shut down, forcing Japan to purchase high cost 
LNG spot cargoes to feed the electricity demand.  
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Similar disruptions in the pattern of gas prices can be found in the case of the US 
Californian Crisis and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Figure 8 below shows clear 
spikes resulting from these disruptions. Siliverstovs et al. (2005) highlights the 
incidents as examples of the lack of international market integration, as the 
Californian Energy Crisis in 2000 and 2001 (May 2000 to September 2001) seem to 
have escaped the other countries’ LNG import prices. This also seems to be the case 
for the period corresponding to Hurricanes Kathrina and Rita (September 05 to March 
06). 
Figure 8: EU, Japanese and USA Imported LNG Prices 
 
Source: based on data from IEA 2009 
 
Lastly, the correlation matrix in Table 1 seems to suggest that there is a closer 
relationship between LNG import prices in Japan and the EU. The reason for this 
may be due to the correlation and links to the oil market. However, it may also be due 
to the fact that both have similar seasonal patterns.  
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3. Non-stationary variables and cointegration 
Testing the relationship between three regional LNG import prices involves 
investigating the extent to which non-stationary data drift together at roughly the 
same rate (Greene, 2008). In particular, non-stationary variables that produce 
stationary residuals provide a framework for testing the stochastic relationship 
between two non-stationary variables (Engle and Granger, 1987). 
3.1 Stationarity and Non-stationarity  
Stationarity refers to a time series that cannot be perfectly predicted (Hill et. al, 
2007). In other words, the next value of the time series is unknown until the variable 
is observed. However, there are some characteristics that follow stationarity. A 
stationary series varies around a constant mean, and has a constant variance. In the 
following, a stationary variable  is said to be integrated of order zero and denoted 
 
Non-stationary time series have a tendency to randomly drift upwards and 
downwards with no real pattern (Hill et.al, 2007). In other words, unlike the 
stationary process, the nonstationary time series does not revert back to its mean over 
a period of time. By applying traditional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression on 
these time series, one may falsely conclude a relationship between two unrelated, 
non-stationary series and also produce spurious regressions (Hill et.al, 2007). The 
false conclusion derives from the infinite-variance property of non-stationary 
variables, thus invalidating the use of OLS.   It is important to overcome the problem 
associated with non-stationary time series, and some series can overcome their non-
stationary relationship by differencing the data a sufficient number of times 
(Kennedy, 2008). For example, if a nonstationary time series is integrated of order 1, 
one should be able to differentiate the variable once and this will produce a stationary 
times series. Hence if , then .   
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3.2 Two step Engle Granger Approach 
The two-step approach to the estimation of cointegration was proposed by Engle and 
Granger (1987). The first step involves running a cointegration regression to obtain 
the residuals. The second step transforms the model to an error correction model 
(ECM), adding the lagged value of these residuals as an extra exogenous term to 
capture the long-run error correction mechanism (Kennedy. 2008). Both steps require 
single-equation OLS estimation, and Banerjee, et.al. (1993) show that these are 
consistent for all parameters. In other words, the distribution of the estimator is 
concentrated in such a way that as the sample size increases to infinity, the estimator 
will approach its true value (Kennedy, 2008). The estimators in the first step are said 
to be super-consistent. This implies that the parameter estimators converge to their 
true values at a much faster rate than the usual rate of  (Banerjee, et.al., 1993). In 
other words, in the cointegrated case, the parameters converge more quickly to their 
true parameter estimators value than those based on the sample moments of stationary 
variables (Kennedy, 2008). Therefore, it enables the model to treat the parameters as 
given in the estimation of the ECM model in the second step (Harris, 1995). 
3.2.1 Step 1: Engle Granger  
In order to illustrate cointegration, assume that the hypothesized long-term 
relationship is: 
(1.0)   
The two variables y and x are non-stationary (integrated of degree 1, denoted I (1)), 
but in the case of cointegration, the disturbance   is stationary, I (0), although it is 
generally autocorrelated.  OLS estimation of (1.0) gives the residual: 
(1.1)  
To test the null hypothesis of no co-integration =0, the Augmented Dickey Fuller 
test (ADF) can be employed. If the ADF test provides evidence to suggest that the 
prices are not cointegrated, it would indicate that residuals are non-stationarity.  
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The ADF test is often preferred to other tests in terms determining stationarity, and 
was also advocated by Engle and Granger (1987). The reason why an augmented test 
is used, compared to the simple Dicker Fuller test, is because it corrects for serial 
correlation in the differenced residual. One way to write the ADF regression is:  
(1.2)    
The residuals are obtained from the static regression equation in (1.0). When using 
ADF tests, one decides on whether to include a trend and a constant, or both when 
modeling the regression in 1.2. The model equation in 1.0 includes a constant because 
economic theory suggests that there is an expected difference between market prices 
that is attributed to transaction and/or transportation costs. Cointegration theory states 
when an expected difference between the series occurs with the endogenous 
variable , and the exogenous variable , in 1.0 averaging zero, a constant is 
included. Moreover Harris (1995) states that a trend component , is not 
recommended because it would potentially result in loss of power.  
3.2.2 Step 2: Engle Granger 
If the ADF test in the first step produces stationary results, the error correction model 
can be used to determine the mechanisms towards equilibrium prices. The residuals, 
from step one, are assessed to the error correction model and is represented by 
equation 1.3.  
 (1.3)  
The term represents the error correction coefficient, while  is the short-term 
error correction model. The coefficient of the lagged endogenous term is denoted . 
Equation 1.3 contains only stationary variables, thus standard t-and F-test are 
applicable. 
This is not the case if the variables y and x are not cointegrated. Then 1.0 does not 
produce stationary residuals and spurious regression could be expected. In other 
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words the OLS tests of the ECM will typically produce high  and significant 
coefficient estimates, even though the y and x are not cointegrated.  
 26 
4. Testing Cointegration of LNG prices 
Economic theory suggests that natural gas prices are regionally isolated and local 
factors of demand and supply govern the prices formation due to predominantly high 
cost of transportation and little flexibility in contracts. This implies that one should 
expect the regional markets also to remain segregated, and not be influenced by each 
other.  
The tests conducted in this section aim to reveal any potential long-term relationships 
between the ex-ship imported LNG prices (price of LNG quoted at the destination). 
In other words, the question asked is whether the small share of uncontracted gas 
sales are large enough to link regional import prices together in the long run.  
4.1 Testing Unit roots in regional LNG prices  
Price series are typically non-stationary. Nevertheless, non-stationarity is a 
precondition for cointegration test and must be verified by a unit root test to see the 
number of times the series needs to be differenced in order to become stationary. The 
unit roots tests are tested with 12 lag lengths for differences and a constant. This is 
then repeated for the differences, and the three the price series. The test shows that all 
the price series are non-stationary and can be differenced to reach stationarity based 
on their respective lag orders. 
Table 2 shows the ADF test statistics for each price series, which are tested against 
McKinnon’s Monte Carlo-simulated critical values. This is undertaken for both the 
log prices and the first differenced log prices. This provides an indication of the 
degree of stationarity properties in the series. As noted in Table 2, in the case of all 
three price series the lag order that provided stationarity is p=9. The choice of lags 
influences the power (rejecting a true null hypothesis when it is false) and size 
properties (type 1 error - rejecting a true null hypothesis) of the test (Harris, 1995). 
Too few lags will provide serially correlated residuals, which will marginalize the 
size properties of the test. However, adding too many lags will adversely affect the 
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power properties because too many lags will reduce the efficient number of 
observations in the test. (Harris, 1995). It is thus important to have just the right 
amount of lags.  
Table 2: Testing for Stationarity in Log- and First Difference Regional LNG 
Prices 
 Log level   First difference  
Variable ADF-t Result  ADF-t Result 
USA LNG 
import price 
p=9 
-0.2507 Non-stationary   -4.869** Stationary 
Japan LNG 
import price 
p=9 
0.0022 Non-stationary  -2.960* Stationary 
EU LNG price 
p=9 
0.0128 Non-stationary  -2.906* Stationary 
Note: ADF tests for first difference (T=124, Constant;* 5%=-2.88; **1%=-3.48) 
ADF tests for log level (T=125, Constant; 5%=-2.88 1%=-3.48) 
From the unit root test, it shows that the first difference is stationary at a 5% 
significance level for all three price series. These critical values depend both on the 
number of sample observations and the inclusion of a constant and/or trend variable. 
After confirming non-stationarity of the variables, a cointegration test can be 
undertaken.  
4.2 Testing cointegration between EU and Japanese 
import LNG prices 
First the null hypothesis of no cointegration is tested without the homogeneity 
restriction imposed. This is then followed by a cointegration test with restriction on 
=1:  
(1.4)     
The long-run static model estimated is based on equation 1.4, where the import price 
of EU is denoted,  and the imported LNG price to Japan is denoted, . The 
coefficient  represents the long-term elasticity and  refers to transportation or 
transaction costs.  
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The long-run residuals are tested with an ADF unit root test. The ADF regression 
does not include a constant, because an intercept was included in the long run 
equation 1.6.  
Table 3: Unit Root Test with EU and Japanese Price Series 
Unit Root test of residuals for Long run relationship:  EU and Japan 
 
  
Specification : 
Constant/trend/None None None None None None None None  
 Model specification p=0 p=1 p=2 p=3 p=4 p=5 p=6 
Unit root test LR -2.631** -2.694** -2.354* -2.741** -2.628** -2.234* -2.283* 
  Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary 
Note: ; (T=121; *5%=-1.94; **1%=-2.58) 
 
Table 3 shows that the time series is stationary in all the models. Following the long-
run cointegration test, the error correction model is estimated. The coefficients in the 
test can be interpreted as elasticities.  
Table 4: ECM with EU and Japanese LNG Prices  
Model based on 3 lags EU and Japan  
 
  Coefficient t-prob 
 0.427 (0.106) 0.00 
 0.294 (0.113) 0.01 
 0.140 (0.04) 0.00 
AR 1-7 test: 
ARCH 1-7 test: 
Normality test: 
hetero test: 
hetero-X test: 
RESET test: 
 
F(7,124) =  0.64015 [0.7219] 
F(7,117) =   1.1962 [0.3104] 
Chi^2(2) =  0.60513 [0.7389] 
F(6,124) =  0.61882 [0.7149] 
F(9,121) =  0.94908 [0.4857] 
F(1,130) =0.0092290 [0.9236] 
 
Note: = ;  =LN ;    
 
 
Here, the (1- ) coefficient represents the deviation from the long-run equilibrium. 
The test states that the implication of 1% increase from the long term equilibrium will 
cause the EU price change to decrease by 0.14%, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, the 
test shows that if the LNG import price rate in Japan increases with 1 %, then a 
0.43% increase in the price rate can be expected in the EU, ceteris paribus. Moreover, 
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from the test of the residuals one can see that there are no abnormal properties of the 
residuals, which further consolidates the results found in the test. 
In the case where =1, the long run static model would look like the equation below.  
(1.5)   
Table 5: ECM with EU and Japanese LNG Prices with Homogeneity 
Restriction 
Model with 3 lags EU and Japan with homogeneity restriction imposed 
 
  Coefficient t-prob 
 0.467 (0.107) 0.00 
 0.393 (0.109) 0.00 
 0.076 (0.032) 0.02 
AR 1-7 test: 
ARCH 1-7 test: 
Normality test: 
hetero test: 
hetero-X test: 
RESET test: 
 
F(7,124) =  0.60946 [0.7472] 
F(7,117) =  0.93413 [0.4830] 
Chi^2(2) =  0.39770 [0.8197] 
F(6,124) =   1.2935 [0.2650] 
F(9,121) =   1.0869 [0.3774] 
F(1,130) =  0.23124 [0.6314] 
 
Note: = ;  =LN ;    
 
With the homogeneity restriction imposed the residuals are tested in a similar fashion 
as without the homogeneity restriction, and the results can be seen in Table 5. Table 5 
provides evidence to suggest that imposing a homogeneity restriction does not change 
the conclusion of cointegration between LNG import prices of EU and Japan. 
4.3 Testing cointegration between EU and USA import 
LNG prices 
The USA is chosen as the endogenous variable, while two dummy variables are 
introduced in the model. The first eliminates the effect of the Californian Energy 
crisis (denoted ) while the second corrects for the effects of Hurricane 
Katrina and Rita (denoted ). 
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The model used to test the long-term cointegrating relationship between the USA and 
EU LNG import prices is given in equation 1.6.  
(1.6)    
The tests show  
Table 6: Unit Root Test with EU and USA Import LNG Prices 
Unit Root test of residuals for Long run relationship:  EU and USA 
 
  
Specification : 
Constant/trend/None None None None None None None None  
 Model specification p=0 p=1 p=2 p=3 p=4 p=5 p=6 
Unit root test LR -4.304** -3.859** -3.159** -3.174** -2.877** -2.889** -3.162** 
  Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary 
Note:    
(T=120; *5%=-1.94; **1%=-2.58) 
 
The next step would now be to test the more general ECM that incorporates the long 
run and short run mechanisms. In Table 7 there is evidence to suggest that that there 
are three coefficients that remain significant at a 5% level. An increase in the price 
rate of 1% in the EU (first difference), will result in a 0.46% increase in the USA. 
Almost the same elasticity applies for the lagged first difference coefficient. This 
coefficient explains an increase at 0.43% in the price of USA given a 1% change in 
the lagged first difference price rate increase. The final coefficient  represents 
the elasticity of the deviation from the long-term equilibrium in the case of EU and 
USA.  This is equal to 0.18%. 
The properties of the residuals seem to indicate that the residuals are not normally 
distributed. Despite this it may be safe to conclude from the test that cointegration 
between the EU and USA market persist.  
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Table 7: ECM with USA and EU Import LNG prices 
Model based on 3 lags: USA and EU 
 
  Coefficient t-prob 
 0.455 (0.209) 0.032 
 0.425 (0.207) 0.042 
 0.184 (0.057) 0.001 
AR 1-7 test: 
ARCH 1-7 test: 
Normality test: 
hetero test: 
hetero-X test: 
RESET test: 
 
F(7,123) =  0.45623 [0.8643] 
F(7,116) =  0.41441 [0.8917] 
Chi^2(2) =   16.590 [0.0002]** 
F(6,123) =  0.81579 [0.5597] 
F(9,120) =   1.0972 [0.3700] 
F(1,129) =  0.64342 [0.4239] 
 
Note:  
 
 
Next the thesis introduces a homogeneity restriction to check if the outcomes of the 
cointegration test changes. By imposing the restriction =1, the model will take the 
form of 1.7: 
(1.7)    
The notation is similar to previous notations. The cointegration test with a 
homogeneity restriction imposed on the LNG import price relationship between the 
USA and the EU, does not seem to change in any significant way as a result of 
imposing the restriction. The test diagnostics of the residuals show that residuals 
continue to fail the normality test. Nevertheless, the two price series remain 
cointegrated. In other words, the conclusion does not change as a result of the 
homogeneity restriction being imposed on the model.  
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Table 8: ECM with USA and EU Import LNG prices with homogeneity 
restriction imposed  
Model based on 3 lags USA and EU w/dummy and homogeneity restriction imposed  
 
  Coefficient t-prob 
 0.450 (0.210) 0.02 
 0.423 (0.210) 0.03 
 0.190 (0.058) 0.00 
Tests:  
AR 1-7 test: 
ARCH 1-7 test: 
Normality test: 
hetero test: 
hetero-X test: 
RESET test: 
 
F(7,122) =  0.51278 [0.8235] 
F(7,115) =  0.54644 [0.7976] 
Chi^2(2) =   21.429 [0.0000]** 
F(6,122) =  0.79450 [0.5760] 
F(9,119) =  0.95379 [0.4818] 
F(1,128) =   1.7408 [0.1894] 
  
Note:  
   
 
4.4 Testing cointgration between Japanese and USA LNG 
prices 
The last LNG import price cointegration test that will be investigated is the LNG 
prices in USA and Japan:  
(1.8)    
This is the static model formulated with  denoting LNG import price of USA and  
 denoting the LNG import price of Japan. As before,  represents a 
dummy variable that aims to correct for the energy crisis (May 2000 to September 
2001) and  represents a dummy variable that eliminates the effect of the 
hurricanes that only seemed to affected the USA LNG prices (September 05 to March 
06).  
The properties of the estimated residuals from the static model specified in the 
equation 1.8 are tested with a unit root test. The results from the unit root test can be 
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seen in Table 9 below. Here, one finds support for a long-term cointegrating 
relationship between the two price series at a 1% significance level. 
Table 9: Unit Root Test of Residuals from USA and Japan 
Unit Root test of residuals for Long run relationship:  USA and Japan w/dummy 
 
  
Specification : 
Constant/trend/None None None None None None None None  
 Model specification D=0 D=1 D=2 D=3 D=4 D=5 D=6 
Unit root test LR -4.107** -3.884** -2.973** -3.188** -2.869** -2.902** -3.090** 
  Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary Stationary 
   
(T=111; 5% =-1.94(*); 1%=-2.58 (**)) 
 
The short term dynamic mechanisms governing the relationship are evaluated in an 
ECM, with lagged difference of the endogenous variables, lagged difference of the 
exogenous price series, and lagged residuals from the static long term OLS 
estimation.  
The coefficients represent elasticities and the test reveals that two parameter 
estimators are significant 10% level. According to the test the second lag difference 
variable elasticity is 0.8. This implies that an increase in second lag price difference 
in Japan will result in an positive increase in the rate of import LNG prices in the 
USA. Moreover, the same refers to a deviation from the long term equilibrium price 
between Japan and USA. The long term equilibrium price elasticity is estimated to be 
0.16. Furthermore, Table 10 shows that the residuals are not normally distributed. 
However, since all the other tests seem to suggest that the residuals are not 
autocorrolated, heteroscedastic and also pass the RESET test (checking for omitted 
variables), it can be concluded that the model used is appropriate. This suggests that 
the import LNG prices between USA and Japan are cointegrated.   
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Table 10: ECM with USA and Japanese LNG Prices 
Model based on 3 lags USA and Japan  
 
  Coefficient t-prob 
 0.779 (0.299) 0.10 
 0.161 (0.055) 0.00 
Tests:  
AR 1-7 test: 
ARCH 1-7 test: 
Normality test: 
hetero test: 
hetero-X test: 
RESET test: 
 
F(7,122) =  0.50805 [0.8270] 
F(7,115) =  0.58544 [0.7666]  
Chi^2(2) =   10.807 [0.0045]**  
F(4,124) =  0.37206 [0.8282]  
F(5,123) =  0.49330 [0.7808]  
F(1,128) =  0.57208 [0.4508]  
 
 Note:  
   
 
Next the following restriction is placed on the model =1. The reason for this is to 
check if the homogeneity restriction holds. The test equation will then take the form 
of equation 1.9 with the same notation: 
(1.9)     
The unit root test on the residuals from the model with a homogeneity restriction does 
not provide any significant changes to the results. Table 11 depicts the OLS 
estimation of the ECM, with the homogeneity restriction imposed on the USA and 
Japanese LNG price series. 
Table 11: ECM with USA and Japan import LNG prices with Homogeneity 
Restriction Imposed 
Model based on 3 lags USA and Japan w/dummy  and homogeneity restriction imposed 
 
  Coefficient t-prob 
 0.840 (0.290) 0.00 
 0.135 (0.050) 0.00 
Tests:  
AR 1-7 test: 
ARCH 1-7 test: 
Normality test: 
hetero test: 
hetero-X test: 
RESET test: 
 
F(7,125) =  0.55114 [0.7941] 
F(7,118) =  0.73754 [0.6406] 
Chi^2(2) =   10.660 [0.0048]** 
F(4,127) =  0.33524 [0.8538] 
F(5,126) =  0.43013 [0.8269] 
F(1,131) =  0.47842 [0.4904] 
 Note:  
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5. Discussion of cointegration results 
The motivation for this study was to investigate to what extent regional LNG import 
prices converge towards each other. The basic theory behind this motivation is the 
extent to which traded LNG is able to transfer price signals from different markets to 
form one global LNG price (netted for differences in transportation costs). The 
traditional LNG market has over the past few years made moves towards an 
environment conducive for global competition between imported LNG prices. This 
move is illustrated by an increasing number of short-term gas sales or spot market 
sales; liberalization efforts in the EU with third party access to re-gasification 
terminals; and an increasing number of shipping vessels available for transportation 
Finally, the expiration of old LNG contracts has also contributed to the move towards 
a globalised LNG market (Neumann, 2008). These are factors that suggest that the 
cointegration between markets will ensure that price changes will, through both short 
term and long term mechanisms, influence each other.  
Several studies with different sources of data have been undertaken to quantify the 
degree of integration between regional natural gas markets. L’H´egaret et al. (2004) 
investigates the degree of market integration between EU, Japan and USA. The 
authors find evidence to suggest, using Johansen maximum likelihood procedure and 
principal components analysis, that the European and Japanese market are integrated. 
However, they do not find evidence to support a long term cointegrating relationship 
between EU/Japan and the United States LNG import price.  
The test results from this thesis, however, seem to be conclusive in determining that 
there is a long-term bilateral relationship between regional gas prices in Japan, the 
USA and the EU. The bivariate testing methodology may be the reason for the 
differences in results.  
All the bivariate testing shows that deviation from the long-term equilibrium explains 
the endogenous price change in the three markets. In the case of the EU and Japan, 
imported LNG price changes in Japan seem to influence the imported LNG price in 
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EU. This may be because both markets are largely linked to the oil price, as 
highlighted in the oil correlation matrix in Table 12. Villar (2006) acknowledge this 
link and suggests that a “world market” for natural gas through LNG likely would 
reinforce the linkages between natural gas and crude oil prices. This may be one 
reason why the test shows a long term relationship between the three markets.   
Table 12: Correlation Matrix of Imported LNG Prices and Oil Prices                                                   
 
Ln(WTI-Spot) Ln(Brent -Spot) 
 0.969 0.969 
 0.902 0.892 
 0.942 0.941 
 
All the LNG prices are correlated to the oil market, and historical convergence 
between these markets may have contributed to the integration of these markets in the 
long run. Especially as the US electricity-generation market and large industries have 
increasingly taken on natural gas as source of fuel, albeit with the capacity to switch 
to both coal and oil. The number of US electricity generators and large industries 
with this capacity is unknown, ranging between 2% to 11% of the total number of 
electricity generators using natural gas as fuel (Foss, 2007). It may act as a ceiling 
and a floor on LNG import prices in USA.      
The latter point is argued by Micola and Bunn (2006) in the case of the 
interconnector (pipeline between UK and Continental Europe), where the mere 
potential of transporting gas from the continent to the UK market can potentially 
eliminate the price difference between the markets. This is conditioned by whether 
there is ample capacity to transfer gas between natural gas markets. Thus, with 
insufficient capacity to transfer gas to the natural gas to the deficit market, this will or 
can potentially result in market decoupling, and local factors will play key driver on 
prices in respective markets.  
From the diagnostics of the residuals one can see that an autocorrelation in the 
residuals exists. This may imply that there is some form of seasonality in the two 
prices that is not corrected for. It can also imply that there are some omitted variables 
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(Kennedy, 2008). As noted in the section describing the different LNG markets, both 
the EU and Japan has one high-demand season (winter). Moreover, both of these 
markets are, through long term contract, tightly woven to the oil market and may due 
to this exhibit similar seasonal behavior. This may explain why the OLS test of ECM 
with EU and Japanese LNG prices indicates autocorrelation.    
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6. Conclusion 
In this thesis the three LNG markets of the USA, Japan and EU are reviewed and 
discussed. The thesis explores the long term and short term bivariate relationship 
between the monthly import LNG prices of Japan and the USA, Japan and the EU 
and finally the USA and the EU. These price relationships are first tested under the 
null hypothesis that there is no cointegration between the markets. This underlying 
assumption is later reviewed by imposing a homogeneity restriction to see if it 
changes the outcome of the cointegration test.  
The results from the tests seem to suggest that there is a long term cointegration 
relationship between the LNG import price series. This implies that LNG prices 
converge in the long run. There may be several reasons for this. Firstly, as seen in 
Table 12, the imported LNG prices are highly correlated with the crude oil prices: 
WTI and Brent. Thus, the oil price may secure indirect mechanisms that provide a 
basis for a long-term relationship between the regional LNG prices. Secondly, 
competition between LNG cargos may also contribute to explain the regional 
cointegration of LNG prices. Despite the lack of opportunities for actual LNG cargos 
to divert with rigid contracts, the mere potential for this to occur may contribute to 
explain parts of the regional integration. The thesis does not investigate the potential 
seasonal effects that may influence the cointegration test. 
The cointegration test between EU and Japanese import LNG prices shows evidence 
of close links between the two markets. The test shows that changes in the Japanese 
LNG prices explain changes in the EU prices. Moreover, the deviations from the long 
term equilibrium price between the two markets also seem to explain the price 
changes in EU LNG import prices. These conclusions do not change with the 
homogeneity restriction imposed.  
The relationship between the imported LNG prices in the USA and the EU in the long 
run provides evidence to suggest a long run cointegrating relationship between the 
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two price series. This result does not change when the homogeneity restriction is 
imposed.  
The LNG market in the USA and Japan are also linked in the long run, according to 
the cointegration test performed in this thesis. It shows that changes in prices in Japan 
seem to be able to explain parts of the changes in the imported LNG price change in 
the USA. Moreover, deviations from the long run equilibrium price also seem to 
explain parts of the changes in the imported LNG price in America. 
In conclusion, there is evidence to suggest that the global LNG market is present. The 
regional markets of the USA, the EU and Japan seem to show evidence of prices 
being linked to each other. This implies that if natural gas demand rises across 
regions, creating higher demand for LNG, price convergence in regional gas prices 
can be expected.   
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7. Data  
An overview of where to obtain the data used in this thesis can be found in the Table 
below. The Table also provides a description of the data. 
Table 13 Description of data used in the thesis 
Data Name Description Where 
LNG import price of EU  These prices are reported in 
both euro and US dollars per 
million British Thermal Units. It 
includes the monthly average 
imported LNG price to all EU 
member states.   
IEA’s Energy Prices and 
Statistics 
LNG import price of Japan These prices are reported in 
both the national currency and 
US dollars per million British 
Thermal Units. It includes 
monthly average imported LNG 
price from all destinations.  
IEA’s Energy Prices and 
Statistics 
LNG import price of USA These prices are reported in 
both the national currency and 
dollars per million British 
Thermal Units. It includes 
monthly average imported LNG 
price from all destinations. 
IEA’s Energy Prices and 
Statistics 
Crude Oil Price WTI These prices are reported in US 
dollars per Barrel. These exist 
in daily, weekly, monthly and 
annual form 
Energy Information 
Administration  
Crude Oil Price Brent These prices are reported in US 
dollars per Barrel. These exist 
in daily, weekly, monthly and 
annual form 
Energy Information 
Administration 
Natural gas data BP publishes natural gas data 
on production, reserves and 
consumption, LNG trade and 
natural gas price data.  BP 
publishes the data in several 
units of measurements 
including cubic feet and cubic 
metric ton of oil equivalent. All 
price data are quoted in 
MMBtu.  
BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy  
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